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THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT DYSFUNCTION: 
PROBLEMS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM 
ERIK M. DICKINSON† 
ABSTRACT: 
This Note argues that WTO member nations should use bilateral and regional 
trade agreements to solve key issues facing the Doha Round negotiations in order to 
lower trade barriers and foster a climate of free trade necessary to resurrect the 
stalled Doha Round. Several problems including the WTO’s lack of authority to 
enforce DSU decisions, protectionist trade measures, and the single undertaking 
have threatened the long term stability of the WTO’s multilateral trading system. 
However, if bilateral and regional trade agreements were used to solve key issues, 
much like they were used by the United States in the 1970s, WTO member nations 
would have a legitimate opportunity to end the Doha Round stalemate once and for 
all.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA), more commonly referred to as the Doha 
Round, was established in November of 2001 at the fourth World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar.1  The negotiations 
are often referred to as the Doha Round because the original “round” of negotiations 
took place in Doha, Qatar.2  The objective of the Doha Round is to facilitate an 
atmosphere of trade liberalization and encourage development by lowering trade 
barriers around the world.3  Specifically, as a development round, Doha seeks to 
“reduce or eliminate agricultural trade barriers”4 in an effort to open trade and 
prosperity toward poor countries.5  These goals came “in response to the urgency of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).”6  Unfortunately, after a decade of negotiations, the Doha Round has 
stalled and is now “the longest trade round in GATT/WTO history.”7   
As a multilateral trade agreement, an agreement between many nations at one 
time,8 a benefit of the Doha Round negotiations is that all nations are treated 
equally.9  However, multilateral trade agreements are very complicated to negotiate10 
and with 149 member nations of the WTO participating in the Doha Round11 it is 
easy to see how disagreements between nations are inevitable.  Further complicating 
the possibility of member nations reaching an agreement is the single undertaking 
that stipulates that “virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole and 
indivisible package and cannot be agreed to separately.”12  Essentially, “nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed.”  Therefore, in order to resurrect the stalled Doha 
Round, this Note recommends that WTO member nations, led by the United States, 
follow a two-step approach.  First, remove the most pressing issues from the 
impractical single undertaking.  Second, focus on solving these issues by reaching 
bilateral and regional agreements.  By following this approach, WTO member 
nations will create the building blocks necessary to move towards successfully 
completing the Doha Round.   
                                                          
 1 Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 573, 577 (2010). 
 2 See id. (discussing the history of the Doha Round). 
 3 Id. at 574-75; see also Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, 
Grand Themes, and China too, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2009).  
 4 Cho, supra note 1, at 577.  
 5 Id.   
 6 Id. at 574-75. 
 7 Id. at 574.  
 8 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).   
 9 See Kimberly Amadeo, Multilateral Trade Agreements, ABOUT.COM, 
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/multilateral.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
 10 Id.   
 11 Id.  
 12 How the Negotiations are Organized, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/work_organi_e.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011).    
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Section II of this Note will provide a brief history of several key trade 
agreements leading up to the creation of the WTO and the Doha Round.  Section III 
will discuss the benefits of the WTO trading system.  Section IV highlights key areas 
where the WTO has failed to effectively facilitate an environment of free trade.  One 
concern is the WTO’s lack of authority to enforce panel or Appellate Body 
decisions13 under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  Another concern is 
the crippling effect the single undertaking has on the negotiations of several highly 
technical and heavily debated issues.  Finally, Section V of this Note concludes that 
using bilateral14 and regional15 agreements to solve key issues will lower trade 
barriers and foster a climate of free trade necessary to resurrect the Doha Round.  
This Note will consider several previously published scholarly opinions on the 
subject of trade liberalization, but will ultimately conclude that bilateral and regional 
trade agreements provide a workable approach to resolve the key issues that have 
stalled the Doha Round. 
II. BACKGROUND 
At the end of World War II, in an effort to move away from the protectionist 
measures of the 1930s, 15 countries began talks to reduce and bind customs tariffs in 
an effort that would eventually produce the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).16  Meanwhile, a group of 50 countries, including the initial 15, were 
negotiating to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) which would 
“extend beyond world trade disciplines, to include rules on employment, commodity 
agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment, and services.”17  
As negotiations on an ITO were ongoing, the GATT negotiators, now expanded to 
23 countries, had reached an agreement that resulted in “a package of trade rules and 
45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, about one fifth of the world’s 
total.”18  The GATT was signed on October 30, 1947 and came into effect on 
                                                          
 13 Casey Reeder, Zeroing in on Charming Betsy: How an Antidumping Controversy 
Threatens to Sink the Schooner, 36 STETSON L. REV. 255, 265 (2006). 
 14 Bilateral trade agreements are between two nations at a time. They are relatively easy to 
negotiate and provide the participating nations with favored trading status between each other. 
See Kimberly Amadeo Bilateral Trade Agreement, ABOUT.COM, 
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/bilateral.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).  
 15 Regional trade agreements are between many nations from a specified area or region. 
Specifically, regional trade agreements facilitate free trade within a region by lifting trade 
barriers like export tariffs. See Regional Trade Agreement, EHOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/facts_6850611_definition-regional-trade-agreements.html (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2013).  
 16 See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter GATT].  
 17 Id.   
 18 Id.  
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January 1, 1948.19  A short time later, in March of 1948, the ITO charter was agreed 
to.20   
A.  GATT 1947 
The original plan was for GATT to operate only provisionally until the ITO 
could establish more comprehensive institutional agreements.21  However, in 1950, 
when the United States government decided not to ratify the ITO charter, the ITO 
was “effectively dead.”22  As a result, “the GATT became the only multilateral 
instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was established 
in 1995.”23  
B.  Tokyo Round & Trade Act of 1974 
In order to continue GATT’s objective of reducing tariffs, 102 countries took part 
in the Tokyo Round which began in 1973.24  In addition, some agreements involving 
non-tariff barriers came out of the negotiations.25  The United States was authorized 
to participate in the Tokyo Round through The United States’ Trade Act of 1974 
(Trade Act of 1974).26  The Trade Act of 1974 also created procedures for approving 
resulting agreements.27  Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974 “allowed Congress to 
work closely with the executive branch during the multilateral negotiations”28 and 
“required a prompt congressional vote on each MTN [Multilateral Trade 
Negotiation] agreement without amendments—a key concession vital to Tokyo 
Round participation by U.S. trading partners, who had been frustrated by past 
congressional undermining of provisions agreed upon in negotiations.”29    
1.  Fast Track Approval Process 
Under section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President was given trade 
agreement authority that “delegated power to the President to negotiate and enter 
into trade agreements on non-tariff barriers provided that Congress retained the final 
                                                          
 19 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 5 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
 20 GATT, supra note 16.  
 21 Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and 
the European Union, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 556, 562-63 (1996-97).  
 22 GATT, supra note 16. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Peter D. Staple, Implementing “Tokyo Round” Commitments: The New Injury Standard 
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1980). 
 27 Id.  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.  
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authority to approve the implementing legislation for these trade agreements.”30  In 
addition, section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 prevented Congress from amending 
provisions (of an agreement) separately and forced Congress to either approve or 
disapprove of the entire agreement as finalized by the participating countries.31  
Moreover, Congress only had 90 days to vote on the trade agreement.32  This 
“expedited approval process” is sometimes referred to as the “fast-track approval 
process.”33  This “fast-track” process meant that foreign governments could reach 
agreements with the U.S. without worrying that the U.S. Congress could alter certain 
aspects of the agreement.34  Thus, the Trade Act of 1974 helped create greater 
liberalization of trade by giving foreign governments more confidence to negotiate 
and reach agreements with the U.S, as evidenced by the several trade agreements 
reached under “fast-track” authority.35  
2.  Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
The Tokyo Round was enacted by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.36  Also, in 
an effort to revise U.S. laws according to the Tokyo Round GATT agreements, the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 reenacted the 1921 Antidumping Act as Title VII of 
the Tariff Act of 1930.37  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 expressly provides that “if there were any conflict between 
any trade agreement and any statute of the United States, then U.S. law would 
prevail.”38  “An accompanying Senate report stated that “Congress adopted [these] 
procedures [Trade Act of 1974 and Trade Agreements Act of 1979] as a means to 
avoid conflict between the Congress and the President such as the dispute which 
occurred after the Kennedy Round.”39  
C.  Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986 with a negotiating agenda 
that covered several trade issues including new areas such as trade in services and 
                                                          
 30 The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-
Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy, No. TA-2111-1, USITC 
Pub. 3621 (Aug. 1, 2003) at 15 [hereinafter USITC].  
 31 Id.   
 32 See Fast Track—Presidential Trade Negotiating Authority, PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/fasttrack/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Fast Track]. 
 33 USITC, supra note 30, at 15.   
 34 Fast Track, supra note 32.  
 35 USITC, supra note 30, at 15. 
 36 Id. at 16-17.  
 37 Mary Jane Alves, Reflections on the Current State of Play: Have U.S. Courts Finally 
Decided to Stop Using International Agreements and Reports of International Trade Panels in 
Adjudicating International Trade Cases?, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 299, 306 (2009).  
 38 Id.  
 39 Id.   
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intellectual property as well as attempts to reform trade in agriculture and textiles.40  
In addition, every original GATT article was up for review, which made the Uruguay 
Round the single largest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed to.41  In December 
1988, early agreements included a more efficient dispute settlement system, a trade 
policy review mechanism focused on reviewing “national trade policies and 
practices of GATT members,”42 and, in an effort to assist developing countries, 
concessions were made on market access for tropical products.43  In December 1991, 
the first draft of the “final act” was completed and became the basis for the final 
agreement.44    
However, over the next two years disagreements arose over issues including 
“agriculture...services, market access, anti-dumping rules, and the proposed creation 
of a new institution.”45  In November 1992, the U.S. and EU came to an agreement 
on agriculture in what is now referred to the “Blair House accord.”46  In July 1993, 
the four major trading partners (U.S., EU, Canada and Japan) came to an agreement 
on market access in an effort to complete the Uruguay Round.47  The Uruguay 
Round was successfully completed on April 15, 1994 when ministers from most of 
the 123 participating governments signed the Marrakesh Declaration.48  
1.  WTO & GATT 1994 
Possibly the most important result of the Uruguay Round was the creation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) which came into existence on January 1, 1995.49  
The new GATT (GATT 1994) was also created under the Uruguay Round and came 
into effect on January 1, 1995.50  “The WTO replaced GATT as an international 
organization, but the General Agreement still exists as the WTO’s umbrella treaty 
for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations.”51  “Trade 
lawyers distinguish between GATT 1994, the updated parts of GATT, and GATT 
1947, the original agreement which is still the heart of GATT 1994.”52   
                                                          
 40 See The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Uruguay 
Round]. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id.  
 45 Id.   
 46 USITC, supra note 30, at 34.  
 47 Id.   
 48 Uruguay Round, supra note 40.  
 49 Robin Miller, J.D., Annotation, Effect of World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions 
Upon United States, 17 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2007).  
 50 Marie Louise Hurabiell, Protectionism versus Free Trade: Implementing the GATT 
Antidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 567, 577 (1995).  
 51 Uruguay Round, supra note 40.  
 52 Id.  
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After completing the largest negotiating mandate on trade ever agreed to, many 
did not believe that another negotiation of the same magnitude would ever be 
possible.53  “Yet, the Uruguay Round agreements contain timetables for new 
negotiations on a number of topics.  And by 1996, some countries were openly 
calling for a new round early in the next century.”54  While the response was mixed, 
“the Marrakesh agreement did already include commitments to reopen negotiations 
on agriculture and services at the turn of the century.  These began in early 2000 and 
were incorporated into the Doha Development Agenda in late 2001.”55 
D.  Doha Round 
The initial outlook on greater market access for developing countries was 
positive in 2001 when the Doha Round began.  However, in 2009, due to the 
collapse of negotiations on agriculture and industrial tariffs between developed and 
developing countries56 in 2003,57 and the start of a global recession in 2008, the 
volume of global trade fell for the first time since World War II.58  Due to the current 
fragile state of the global economy, a failure by the WTO member nations to 
resurrect the stalled Doha Round “would further discredit the WTO system and 
supply ample ammunition to politicians leaning toward protectionism.”59  According 
to Marcus Wallenberg, “the lack of political will on the part of WTO members to 
resolve differences on agricultural subsidies and market access has put the entire 
round and the multilateral trading system in peril.”60  Therefore, in order to avoid an 
era of global protectionism, member nations participating in the Doha Round 
negotiations need to narrow their focus to reaching regional and bilateral trade 
agreements that address the issues at the heart of the stalled Doha Round. These 
agreements would have the desired effect of lowering trade barriers and creating 
greater market access for developing countries. 
                                                          
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Lamy Cites Talks’ ‘Paralysis’ as Members Admit Latest 
Doha Failure, WTO REP. (July 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X1JJILR36Q80.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Cho, supra note 1, at 589; see also Open Markets Would Support Rebound in Trade in 
2010, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Jan. 13, 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/SurveyartB.htm (indicating that trade 
volume fell by 18 percent).  
 59 Cho, supra note 1, at 589.  
 60 In quotes: The Doha deadlock, BBC NEWS (July 26, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5216080.stm (statements of Marcus Wallenberg, 
International Chamber of Commerce). 
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III. BENEFITS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
The WTO provides a forum for its 153 member nations61 to negotiate trade 
agreements and settle trade disputes.62 In order to achieve the main objective which 
is to help “ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible,”63 
the WTO attempts to ensure that “individuals, companies and governments know 
what the trade rules are around the world.”64  In doing so, the WTO believes that 
these entities will have the confidence necessary to actively participate in trade 
agreements that will facilitate “economic development and well-being.”65  
According to the WTO, there are 10 benefits of the multilateral trading system.66  
First, the system promotes peace among the member nations.67  The WTO believes 
that it has contributed to world peace by “helping trade to flow smoothly, and 
providing countries with a constructive and fair outlet for dealing with disputes over 
trade issues.”68  It is commonplace throughout history for trade disputes to cause 
war.69  Most notably, a trade war came about in the 1930s when “countries competed 
to raise trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers and retaliate against 
each other’s barriers.  This worsened the Great Depression and eventually played a 
part in the outbreak of World War [II].”70  In response, the GATT and the WTO 
were created as trading systems that would promote free trade and prevent 
protectionist measures that had led to war in the past.71    
The second benefit of the WTO trading system is the dispute settlement 
understanding (DSU) which provides WTO member nations with a forum to handle 
disputes constructively.72  When conflicts arise between member nations, the DSU 
allows for specially appointed independent experts to determine whether the accused 
party successfully followed the rules as set forth in the applicable WTO agreement.73  
                                                          
 61 See Who we are, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).   
 62 Id.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See 10 benefits of the WTO trading system, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 67 See 1. The system helps to keep the peace, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See 2. The system allows disputes to be handled constructively, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b02_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 73 Who we are, supra note 61. 
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Third, the rules of the WTO multilateral trading system make life easier for member 
nations.74  With the WTO, “a single set of rules applying to all members greatly 
simplifies the entire trade regime.”75  In addition, smaller countries have increased 
bargaining power under multilateral agreements because all parties to the agreement 
have equal rights.76  Therefore, when more powerful developed countries fail to 
follow the rules, smaller developing countries now have the ability to challenge the 
developed countries under the DSU.77      
The fourth benefit of the WTO multilateral trading system is that free trade 
lowers the cost of living.78  The bottom line is that while “protectionism is 
expensive,”79free trade benefits consumers and “we are all consumers.”80  With 153 
member nations taking part in the WTO system, which promotes free trade, trade 
barriers have been lowered.81  The result has been “reduced costs of 
production...reduced prices of finished goods and services, and ultimately a lower 
cost of living.”82  Fifth, the WTO trading system provides a greater variety of 
products and qualities to choose from.83  Lower trade barriers provide greater market 
access to countries that export goods and services.84 Once they arrive in the U.S., 
these imports give consumers more options.  In addition, “[e]ven the quality of 
locally-produced goods can improve because of the competition from imports.”85   
Sixth, the WTO trading system increases trade which leads to increased 
incomes.86  “The WTO’s own estimates for the impact of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
                                                          
 74 See 3. A system based on rules rather than power makes life easier for all, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b03_ e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 75 Id.  
 76 See Kimberly Amadeo, Multilateral Trade Agreements, ABOUT.COM, 
http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/multilateral.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2011). 
 77 Id.  
 78 See 4. Freer trade cuts the cost of living, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b04_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See 5. It gives consumers more choice, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b05_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 84 See What we stand for, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 85 It gives consumers more choice, supra note 83.    
 86 See 6. Trade raises incomes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b06_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011).  
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trade deal were between $109 billion and $510 billion added to world income 
(depending on the assumptions of the calculations and allowing for margins of 
error).”87  Seventh, the WTO trading system creates free trade which in turn creates 
jobs by stimulating economic growth.88  According to the WTO, “trade boosts 
economic growth, and that economic growth means more jobs.”89  The eighth benefit 
of the WTO multilateral trading system is efficiency.90  Through policies of non-
discrimination, transparency, increased certainty and trade facilitation, the WTO 
system increases efficiency and cuts costs.91   
The ninth benefit is that the WTO system shields governments from the narrow 
interests of lobbyists.92  Lobbyists put pressure on the government to protect their 
respective industries from imports that are more competitively priced.93  The 
resulting protection is often achieved by raising tariffs,94 or providing government 
subsidies to the domestic industry.95  However, this behavior “biases the economy 
against other sectors which shouldn’t be penalized,” for example, “if you protect 
your clothing industry, everyone else has to pay for more expensive clothes, which 
puts pressure on wages in all sectors.”96  Lastly, the WTO trading system encourages 
governments to follow better policies while discouraging unwise practices such as 
corruption.97  “For businesses, [this] means greater certainty and clarity about trading 
conditions.  For governments it can often mean good discipline.”98 
                                                          
 87 Id.  
 88 See 7. Trade stimulates economic growth, and that can be good news for employment 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/ 
10b07_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 89 Id.  
 90 See 8. The basic principles make the system economically more efficient, and they cut 
costs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
10ben_e/10b08_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).  
 91 Id.   
 92 See 9. The system shields governments from narrow interests, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b09_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 93 Id.  
 94 See Tariffs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 95 See Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 96 The system shields governments from narrow interests, supra note 92. 
 97 See 10. The system encourages good government, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b10_e.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011).  
 98 Id.  
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Although there are many benefits of the WTO multilateral trading system, this 
Note will examine certain aspects of the system that appear to hinder the WTO’s 
ability to ensure that “trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”99   
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WTO MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
While the WTO as a whole provides many benefits to its member nations, the 
multilateral trading system often creates several problems that make reaching trade 
agreements very difficult.100  As evidenced by the stalled Doha Round, two of the 
most pressing problems are the WTO’s lack of authority to enforce DSU decisions 
and the crippling effect of the single undertaking.   
A.  WTO’s Lack of Authority to Enforce DSU Decisions 
As one author points out, “perhaps the biggest challenge presented by…dispute 
settlement structures is the utter lack of enforcement power.”101  The DSU oversees 
the dispute resolution process for the WTO member nations.102  First, a three-
member panel103 of specially appointed independent experts is assembled.104  When 
hearing a case the panel must make “an objective assessment of the facts of the case 
and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”105  
Next, after the panel has released their report, the adverse party may appeal to the 
Appellate Body.106  The Appellate Body is made up of seven members but only three 
members hear a particular case.107  The DSU panels do not interpret or apply the 
domestic law of any member nation.108  Instead, DSU panels determine whether a 
particular agency of a certain WTO member nation acted in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the applicable trade agreements.109  Essentially, the DSU panels 
and Appellate Body decisions are a “non-binding interpretation of an international 
agreement.”110  As a result, it is not uncommon for “major powers…[to] 
                                                          
 99 Who we are, supra note 61. 
 100 Multilateral Trade Agreements, supra note 76. 
 101 Reeder, supra note 13, at 286. 
 102 Id. at 264.  
 103 Id. at 265.  
 104 See What we do, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited May 13, 2013).  
 105 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 106 Reeder, supra note 13, at 265.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id.  
 109 Id.  
 110 Filicia Davenport, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act Supremacy Clause: 
Congressional Preclusion of the Charming Betsy Standard with Respect to WTO Agreements, 
15 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 279, 309 (2005) [hereinafter Davenport]; see also Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen 
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ignore…dispute settlement decisions which do not comport with their economic 
interests.”111    
1.  URAA Supremacy Clause 
In 1994, when the WTO was formed out of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 
Congress was reluctant to cede any authority to the WTO in its new capacity as an 
international law making body.112  In order to “ensure the primacy of United States 
law,”113 the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) “included as its first provision 
a section best described as the URAA Supremacy Clause.”114  While this author 
understands that DSU decisions are not binding on other countries for reasons other 
than those explored here, this section focuses on the United States as one example of 
how a WTO member nation may ensure that DSU decisions are nothing more than 
non-binding interpretations of an international agreement.115   
2.  Corus Staal BV v. United States Department of Commerce 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Corus 
Staal BV v. United States Department of Commerce116 (Corus Staal II) recognized 
the effect of the URAA Supremacy Clause.117  Specifically, in Corus Staal II, the 
court determined that WTO decisions are “not binding on the United states, much 
less this Court.”118  Moreover, “no provision of any of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements…, nor the application of any such provision to any person or 
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have 
effect.”119  
                                                          
from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Bed Linen]; see also Corus Staal BV 
v. U.S. Dept. of Com., 27 C.I.T. 388 (2003), modified, 27 C.I.T. 1180 (2003), 27 C.I.T. 1469 
(2003), and 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 111 Michael Patrick Tkacik, Post-Uruguay Round GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Substance, Strengths, Weaknesses, and Causes for Concern, 9 INT’L. LEGAL PERSP. 169, 169 
(1997).   
 112 Senator Robert Dole, advocating in Congressional hearings for the passage of the 
URAA stated: “Our sovereignty is not threatened by the WTO. The WTO has no power to 
force the United States to do anything. They cannot make us do anything. It is not a 
world power. If the WTO finds that U.S. law does not square with the obligations we have 
assumed under the agreement, we remain totally free to disregard that finding. It does not 
change U.S. law.” Kevin P. Cummins, Trade Secrets: How the Charming Betsy Canon may do 
more to Weaken U.S. Environmental Laws than the WTO's Trade Rules, 12 Fordham Envtl. 
L.J. 141 (2000) [hereinafter Trade Secrets].  
 113 See Davenport, supra note 110, at 288.  
 114 Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2000)). Section 3512 is the third provision in the URAA, 
following § 3501 (“Definitions” and § 3511 (“Approval and entry into force of Uruguay 
Round Agreements”). 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3511.  
 115 See Reeder, supra note 13, at 282-83.   
 116 See Corus Staal II, 395 F.3d at 1347-49. 
 117 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1). 
 118 See Corus Staal II, 395 F.3d at 1348 (internal citation omitted). 
 119 Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1)). 
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As a result, when WTO agreements or DSU decisions are inconsistent with 
United States law, it is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts to either ignore 
the DSU decisions as inconsistent with the interests of the United States or honor our 
trade agreements by incorporating the DSU decisions into the applicable statutes.120  
However, with constant turnover of members and party majorities in Congress, 
incorporating DSU decisions into United States law may be a difficult feat to 
accomplish.  As Senator Robert Dole stated, “If the WTO finds that U.S. law does 
not square with the obligations we have assumed under the agreement, we remain 
totally free to disregard that finding.  It does not change U.S. law.”121  Moreover, 
external pressure from lobbyists and special interest groups, that may oppose 
opening their markets to foreign competition, may make deferring to international 
pressures even less appealing.          
B.  Problems with Protectionist Measures 
While the “URAA Supremacy Clause” provides Congress with the ability to 
“veto” any unintended implications of an agreement, many negative consequences of 
the clause remain.   One such consequence is the inability of the DSU to effectively 
curtail protectionist measures like anti-dumping laws, agricultural subsidies and 
zeroing.    
1.  Anti-dumping laws 
The source of domestic anti-dumping laws in the United States is the Tariff Act 
of 1930.122  Ultimately, dumping is “the sale or likely sale of goods at less than fair 
value.”123  The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) calculates a dumping 
margin in order to determine whether a product is being dumped on the U.S. 
market.124  The dumping margin is “the difference between the prices for the 
merchandise in the exporter's home market and the importing country.”125  
Therefore, under U.S. law, “dumping occurs when a product is sold in the U.S. for 
less than it is sold for in its home market, or if it has no home market, for less than 
it’s otherwise determined ‘normal value.”’126   
One argument for using anti-dumping laws is that they are necessary to prevent 
predatory dumping.  For example, by selling a product at a very low price in a 
market, a foreign producer can drive out its domestic competition and then raise its 
originally low price to a much higher price with impunity.127  Under U.S. law, the 
government may take action against dumping if: “(1) it causes or threatens to cause 
                                                          
 120 See id. at 1348-49.  
 121 See Trade Secrets, supra note 112, at 141. 
 122 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683g (2000).   
 123 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34). 
 124 Reeder, supra note 13, at 256.  
 125 Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 10 
(1995). 
 126 Reeder, supra note 13, at 256-57. 
 127 See Frances Chang, Arguing Both Sides: Positional Conflicts of Interest in Antidumping 
Proceedings, 19 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 583, 584-85 (2006). 
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material injury to an established industry in the importing country; or (2) it 
materially retards the establishment of an industry in that country.”128  As a result, 
the country harmed by the dumping “may react to dumping by imposing an 
antidumping duty on the dumped merchandise in the amount of the dumping 
margin.”129  
Although anti-dumping laws may seem necessary to facilitate an environment of 
fair trade, in application, anti-dumping laws can rarely distinguish between predatory 
and other forms of dumping, leading some commentators to argue that anti-dumping 
laws are “economically inefficient.”130   
2.  Agricultural subsidies 
In 2008, the Doha Round seemed to be heading toward successful compromise 
on several key issues when talks led by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy created 
a proposal focusing on the most recent draft modalities on agriculture and non-
agricultural market access (NAMA).131  Yet, in 2009, a major stumbling block 
occurred when perceptions arose that the U.S. was unwilling to commit to the 
December 2008 agricultural and (NAMA) draft texts.132  As a result, the goal to 
lower trade barriers around the world has been stalled due to differences between the 
developed world (U.S., EU and Japan) and emerging economies such as India, Brazil 
and China.133  The main disagreement is on the extent of liberalization of trade in 
industrial goods, agriculture, and services.134  Specifically, developing countries 
want future negotiations to proceed from the agriculture and NAMA texts of 2008.135  
However, U.S. industry strongly opposes proceeding from those texts.136   
Nowhere is the tension between the critics and the proponents of the 
existing multilateral trading system more evident than in matters of 
agricultural policy. Indeed, agriculture was one of the most contentious 
issues in the recent WTO Ministerial meeting in Qatar and has been one 
of the most controversial issues in the multilateral trade negotiations for 
the past fifty years. The controversy stems from the fact that the rules 
governing agricultural trade, as embodied in the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, are perceived as allowing the United States and the European 
                                                          
 128 Bhala, supra note 125, at 9-10.   
 129 Id. at 10. 
 130 See Alice Vacek-Aranda, Sugar Wars: Dispute Settlement under NAFTA and the WTO 
as Seen through the Lens of the HFCS Case, and its effects on U.S.-Mexican Relations, 12 
TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & POL’Y 121, 128 (2006). 
 131 Cho, supra note 1, at 581. 
 132 Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 44 INT'L LAW. 93, 94 (2010).  
 133 Amrit Dhillon, WTO Chief Lamy Visits India in Bid to Jump-Start Stalled Doha Round, 
INT’L TRADE REP. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
XAN3MFG5GVG0. 
 134 Id.   
 135 Bentes, supra note 132, at 94. 
 136 Id.  
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Union to continue to subsidize agricultural production and to dump 
surpluses on world markets at artificially depressed prices while requiring 
developing countries to open up their markets to ruinous and unfair 
competition from industrialized country producers.137 
While the central theme of the Doha Round is to use free trade in an effort to 
promote economic development and alleviate poverty,138 several problems stemming 
from the WTO agreement on agriculture (WAA),139 which came about during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations,140 have led to the Doha Round’s most difficult impasse 
to date. Many problems came directly out of the WAA’s negotiation process. 
Specifically, the negotiation process was greatly influenced by the intense rivalry 
between the United States and the European Union for world agricultural markets.141 
As a result of this rivalry, several developing countries were essentially left out of 
the negotiating process.142  In addition, while the WAA was intended to create 
greater market access for developing countries, the developed countries 
commandeered the negotiations in an effort to further stack the deck in their favor. 
Therefore, while the WAA on its face appears to create greater market access for 
developing countries, the WAA allows developed countries to use several loopholes 
in order to maintain the status quo.   
There are three major provisions of the WAA that “obligate” WTO members to 
liberalize agricultural trade.143 First, the WAA attempts to achieve greater market 
access by requiring that all non-tariff barriers be converted into tariffs and then 
requiring the binding and reduction of those tariffs.144 Second, the WAA requires 
that both the volume of subsidized exports and the expenditures on subsidized 
                                                          
 137 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 437-38 (2002) 
[hereinafter Gonzalez]. 
 138 Id. at 435.  
 139 While the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture being discussed in this 
note have already run their course and additional legislation has  been passed by the 
United States congress, these provisions remain important because they have created many of 
the problems currently plaguing the Doha Round.    
 140 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 449.  
 141 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT and Global 
Free Trade, in GATT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 72 (Masayosi Homna et 
al. eds., 1993). 
 142 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 449.   
 143 Id. at 452.   
 144 See Dale E. McNiel, Furthering the Reforms of Agricultural Policies in the Millennium 
Round, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 41, 61 (2000); see also Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT 875-76 (H. Applebaum & L. Schlitt eds., 1995). The tariff reduction 
and other market access obligations are spelled out in individual country schedules rather than 
in the body of the Agreement. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 
(available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf).  
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exports be reduced.145 Third, the WAA “requires the reduction of trade-distorting 
domestic subsidies.”146 However, as previously mentioned, due to the negotiations of 
the WAA being a one sided affair, greatly favoring developed countries maintaining 
the status-quo, many of these provisions have failed to create economic development 
and alleviate poverty in developing and least developed countries.147 
Under the first WAA provision, over a period of several years, the tariffs must be 
bound and reduced to below 1986-88 base levels.148 The exact amount of tariff 
reduction for each member to the agreement is specified in each country’s individual 
tariff schedule.149 However, developed countries must reduce bound tariffs by an 
average of 36 percent over 6 years (1995-2000), at a minimum rate of 15 percent for 
each product line.150 In addition, developing countries only need to reduce bound 
tariffs by an average of 24 percent over 10 years (1995-2004), at a minimum rate of 
10 percent for each product line.151 Moreover, while least developed countries are 
also subject to converting non-tariffs into tariffs and then binding those tariffs, 
“[l]east developed countries...are not subject to tariff reduction.”152 Lastly, the WAA 
does not allow WTO members to maintain or revert back to the non-tariff barriers 
that were required to be converted into tariffs.153  
While the aforementioned market access provision of the WAA appears to level 
the playing field for developing countries, developed countries, at the insistence of 
the European Union, were able to insert a safeguard provision into the agreement.154 
This special safeguard provision allows for the imposition of an additional duty on a 
product.  However, that additional duty is subject to conversion from a non-tariff 
into a tariff if there is an import surge or in the event of particularly low prices, as 
compared with 1986-88 levels.155 An example is, “if the world market price for a 
particular commodity drops by more than 10 percent below the 1986-88 reference 
price (the trigger price), an additional duty may be applied to maintain price 
                                                          
 145 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 452-53.    
 146 Id. at 453.   
 147 Id. at 459-60.   
 148 See Ian Sturgess, The Liberalisation Process in International Agricultural Trade: 
Market Access and Export Subsidies, in NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL 
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 149 See Jeffrey J. Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for 
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 150 Sturgess, supra note 148, at 147; see also Steinle, supra note 149, at 346.   
 151 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 453-54; see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 
144, at art. 15:2.   
 152 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454; see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, 
at art. 15:2.     
 153 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 4.    
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stability.”156 Therefore, because the additional duty rises as the world market price 
for that commodity drops, this provision is similar to the variable levy system used 
by the European Union because it protects domestic markets from cheaper foreign 
imports.157  
Another practice used by developed countries to evade the underlying purpose of 
the WAA’s requirements is referred to as “dirty tariffication.”158  Dirty tariffication 
is often used by “setting of tariff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at an excessively 
high level.”159 Moreover, “[d]irty tariffication nullified the benefits of tariff bindings 
and tariff reduction by creating tariff equivalents, to which subsequent reductions 
apply, that were at times more import-restrictive than the non-tariff barriers they 
replaced.”160 Worse still, in the situations where dirty tariffication resulted in greater 
levels of protectionist behavior than the old system allowed, the highest tariffs were 
for exactly the types of products that are of particular interest to developing 
countries.161 Thus, the safeguard provision and the use of “dirty tariffication” allow 
many developed countries to continue using the very same protectionist practices 
that the WAA intended to prevent.      
Under the second WAA provision, both the volume of subsidized exports and the 
expenditures on subsidized exports must be reduced.162 Specifically, developed 
countries are required to lower their expenditures for export subsidies by 36 percent 
and lower their volume of subsidized exports by 21 percent over 6 years (1995-2000) 
based on the 1986-88 base period.163 In addition, developing countries are required to 
cut spending on export subsidies by 24 percent and lower their amount of subsidized 
exports by 14 percent over 10 years (1995-2004).164 Moreover, while least developed 
countries are not allowed to increase subsidized exports, least developed countries 
do not have to reduce export subsidies.165 Lastly, a key distinction between the first 
and second WAA provisions is that the second WAA provision applies on a 
                                                          
 156 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454; see also Sturgess, supra note 148, at 147.  
 157 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 454. 
 158 Id. at 460.  
 159 Id.; see also Sturgess, supra note 148, at 148-49. 
 160 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 460. 
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commodity-by-commodity basis, unlike the first WAA provision which applied on 
the basis of an industry average.166      
Once again, much like the first WAA provision, there is a loophole under the 
second WAA provision. Under the second WAA provision, countries are allowed to 
combine commodities in order to comply with the export subsidy reduction 
requirements.167 Basically, a country could treat wheat, wheat flour and other wheat 
based commodities as a single group.168 As a result, a country which subsidized 
wheat and wheat based products during the base period would be able to shift 
subsidies among the wheat based products so long as the country meets the required 
export reduction with regards to wheat based commodities in the aggregate.169 
Essentially, the country would create an unfair advantage.    
The unfair advantage is gained because the wheat producing country could, by 
combining several like commodities into one group and then shifting the export 
subsidies among some but not all wheat commodities, continue to be overly 
protectionist as to their most profitable and competitive wheat export while at the 
same time only reducing export subsidies on their menial/uncompetitive wheat 
exports. In addition, using export subsidies, like the example above, is “heavily 
concentrated in a handful of countries.”170 For example, “only 25 out of 135 
countries have the right under the Agreement to subsidize exports, and three 
exporting countries account for 93 percent of wheat subsidies, 80 percent of beef 
subsidies, and 94 percent of butter subsidies.”171 As supported throughout this 
section, the second WAA provision, like the first, has failed to level the playing field 
for developing and least developed countries in a meaningful way.  
Finally, under the third WAA provision, WTO member nations must reduce 
domestic subsidies based on an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).
172
 For each 
WTO member, the Base Total AMS is a “quantification” of all domestic agricultural 
subsidies during the time period of 1986-1988.
173
 Developed countries were to 
reduce their Base Total AMS by 20 percent over 6 years (1995-2000) while 
developing countries were to reduce their Base Total AMS by 13.3 percent over 10 
years.
174
 Whether or not a member nation complies is measured by the Current Total 
AMS, which is the level of support actually provided in a given year.
175
 An 
important distinction between the Base Total AMS and the Current Total AMS is 
that “[w]hile the Base Total AMS (the benchmark from which reductions are made) 
                                                          
 166 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 144, at art. 9; see also Sturgess, supra note 
148, at 147-48.  
 167 Gonzalez, supra note 137, at 455.   
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is a comprehensive quantification of domestic subsidies during the base period, the 
Current Total AMS (the standard used to measure compliance) only includes the 
subsidies deemed to be most trade-distorting (so-called “amber box” policies).”176   
There are two important categories of domestic support that are excluded from 
the Current Total AMS.177 First, for developed countries, “the Current Total AMS 
excludes products where the amount of support is less than 5 percent of the total 
annual value of production.”178 However, for developing countries, the Current Total 
AMS excludes products where the amount of support is less than 10 percent of the 
total annual value of production.
179
 Second, “the Current Total AMS excludes direct 
payments under production limiting programs (“blue box” exemption).”180 Examples 
include U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation payments. Both of these 
payments, which go to farmers, give farmers the difference between a government 
target price for agricultural commodities and the corresponding market price.
181
  
These “blue box” exemptions are extremely unfair to developing and least developed 
countries because including U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation 
payments in the calculation of the Base Total AMS while failing to exclude them 
from the Current Total AMS basically gives the U.S. and the E.U. credit for 
domestic subsidy reductions they never made.
182
   
Moreover, “The exclusion of “blue box” subsidies from the Current Total AMS 
undermined the effectiveness of the [WAA’s] subsidy reduction obligations by 
excluding precisely the types of domestic support most utilized by developed 
countries, namely U.S. deficiency payments and E.U. compensation payments.”183  
For example, in the United States, during 2002, congress passed a law that was 
projected to increase subsidy payments by 74 percent over 10 years.184 Lastly, under 
the WAA, certain “green box” support measures, such as income support to farmers 
decoupled from production, income safety-net programs, and crop insurance 
programs, are not required to be reduced.
185
    
Under the WAA, which required countries to reduce domestic subsidies in order 
to level the playing field, developed countries were able to use several trade-
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distorting domestic subsidies (through the use of several exemptions) while 
developing countries were prevented from using similar practices.
186
  As a result, for 
developing countries, the WAA has been a wolf in sheep’s clothing causing a great 
deal of the distrust that has led to the Doha Round stalemate.
187
 
With many anti-dumping laws failing to accurately target predatory dumping188 
and agricultural subsidies that create a greater rift between developed and developing 
countries, resulting in the increase of trade disputes dealing with protectionist trade 
measures,189 the WTO has been unable to solve these disputes because it lacks the 
authority to enforce the relevant DSU decisions.190 
Despite the proliferation of international trade agreements and the 
accompanying development of sophisticated structures of international 
dispute resolution, if nations have no intention of being bound by the 
terms of these agreements, the language of ‘free and fair trade’ is no more 
than lofty rhetoric.191  
C.  The Single Undertaking 
In the midst of a world recession, developed countries like the United States have 
little incentive to provide greater market access to developing countries.  Moreover, 
without reciprocal concessions by emerging economies like China, Brazil and India, 
developed countries become even more resistant to the idea of providing developing 
countries with greater market access.  Further complicating the possibility of greater 
market access to developing countries is the single undertaking.  To many, the single 
undertaking is “a key element” to negotiations under the WTO multilateral trading 
system.192  Under the single undertaking, “[v]irtually every item of the negotiation is 
part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed [to] separately.”193  
Essentially, “[n]othing is agreed until everything is agreed.”194   
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Those in favor of the WTO multilateral trading system believe the single 
undertaking gives developing countries increased bargaining power because, under 
the multilateral system, all parties to an agreement have equal rights.195  However, 
due to the “diametrically opposed perceptions of the Round between developed and 
developing countries,”196 the single undertaking has failed to bring WTO member 
nations together.  Instead, as one commentator opines, “[i]t may well be that the core 
underpinning of the negotiations, the single undertaking, has become an obstructing, 
rather than facilitating, factor.”197  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the stalled Doha Round, certain aspects of the WTO multilateral 
trading system are problematic.  With the Doha Round entering its eleventh year of 
negotiations it is time for WTO member nations to ditch the status quo.  In order to 
make meaningful progress towards an agreement, the member nations involved in 
the Doha Round negotiations should abandon the impractical single undertaking and 
focus on solving the most pressing issues by reaching bilateral and regional 
agreements. In 1980, several nations attempted to open a round of multilateral trade 
negotiations.198 However, in 1982, much like present day, many nations were 
reluctant to engage in trade liberalization due to a world recession, high 
unemployment and debt problems.199 As a result, the United States shifted its focus 
to reaching bilateral and regional trade agreements in order to achieve trade 
liberalization.200   
Recently, the European Council announced that it would be moving towards 
more bilateral and regional agreements.201 Specifically, the European Council stated:   
Whilst strengthening and widening the multilateral system and concluding 
the WTO Doha Round remain crucial objectives given their expected 
benefits in terms of growth and job creation, renewed emphasis should be 
given to bilateral and regional agreements, particularly with strategic 
partners and those whose markets are expanding at a significant pace. 
Such efforts should in particular be geared to the removal of trade 
barriers, better market access, [etc.]202  
While the commitment by the European Council is a step in the right direction, in 
order to resolve the key issues that have stalled the Doha Round, the United States 
and other key members of the WTO should remove the most pressing issues from 
the impractical single undertaking and attempt to solve them by using bilateral and 
regional agreements.  In doing so, developed countries may finally deliver on their 
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eleven-year-old promise to lower trade barriers and create greater market access for 
developing and least developed countries.   
 
